讲座题目：Mobility of Scientists and the Spread of Ideas
时间：2018.03.09 周五，下午15:10 - 16:30
Abstract：We use data on newly hired university scientists to provide evidence on the impact of labor mobility on the diffusion of ideas across space. To do this, we compare local citations to pre-move articles of a newly hired scientist with citations to runners-up for the same position, before and after the move. Post move, a scientist’s articles receive twice as many citations from patents of local companies and 70% more citations from local university scientists than the articles of the runners-up do. However, the overall number of citations does not change, suggesting a relocation of local spillovers. Local knowledge flows to the private sector originate mainly from academic stars and the hard sciences. Within academia, the effects are homogeneous across fields and quality of researchers. These results suggest that labor mobility changes the access to local knowledge which in turn affects the direction of innovation in a region.
Monika Schnitzer是德国慕尼黑大学讲座教授，曾任哈佛大学、加州大学伯克利分校、耶鲁大学、斯坦福大学和麻省理工学院访问教授。曾任2013-2016德国经济学会主席；2016年欧洲经济学会(EEA)年会组委会主席；1998-2006，J. of Ind. Ec.及 German Economic Review副主编；2005-7欧洲经济学会执委。主要研究领域是产业组织及公司组织理论，特别是创新及跨国公司。研究成果显赫，在顶级及一流期刊上发表了多篇论文，其中包括：American Ec. Rev., J. European Ec. Assoc., Econ. J., Rand J. of Ec., J. of Int. Ec., Review of Ec. and Stat., J. of Banking and Finance, J. of Industrial Ec., European Ec. Rev., Int. J. of IO, J. of Comparative Ec., Canadian J. of Ec., Economica, World Economy等。
讲座题目：Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies
Abstract：The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each seller prefers to conceal his information until he is awarded the contract and then renegotiate when he is in a bilateral monopoly position with the buyer. We show that this gives rise to three inefficiencies: inefficient renegotiation, inefficient production and inefficient design. We derive the welfare optimal direct mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. The direct mechanism, however, imposes strong assumptions on the buyer's prior knowledge of possible flaws and their payoff consequences. Therefore, we also propose an indirect mechanism that implements the same allocation but does not require any such prior knowledge. The optimal direct and indirect mechanisms separate the improvement of the design and the selection of the seller who produces the good.
Klaus Schmidt是德国慕尼黑大学讲座教授，世界计量经济学会（Econometric Society）及欧洲经济学会（European Economic Association）院士，曾任哈佛大学、加州大学伯克利分校、耶鲁大学、斯坦福大学和麻省理工学院访问教授。Schmidt 教授研究领域跨越经济学众多子学科，包括行为与实验经济学、合同理论、博弈论、产业与组织理论、劳动经济学、拍卖理论和政治经济学等。他研究成果显赫，在世界顶级的经济、管理和金融学期刊上发表了近五十篇论文，其中包括顶级期刊American Ec. Review, Econometrica, Quarterly J. of Ec., Review of Ec. Studies；A类期刊 J. of Finance, J. of Ec. Theory, Management Science, J. of European Economic Association, Economic J., Rand J. of Ec. 等。其中Fehr and Schmidt (1999, QJE), “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation,”是行为与实验经济学引用最多的几篇文章之一。曾任European Economic Review主编及Review of Economic Studies, Management Science, J. of European Economic Association, Rand J. of Economics等副主编。