[Double seminar 03/09] Klaus Schmidt and Monika Schnitzer
发布时间: 2018-03-05 浏览次数: 8

Mobility of Scientists and the Spread of Ideas

Speaker:Monika Schnitzer (University of Munich) 

2018.03.09, Friday, 15:10 - 16:30

Minxing Building 102, Nanjing Audit University

Abstract:We use data on newly hired university scientists to provide evidence on the impact of labor mobility on the diffusion of ideas across space. To do this, we compare local citations to pre-move articles of a newly hired scientist with citations to runners-up for the same position, before and after the move. Post move, a scientist’s articles receive twice as many citations from patents of local companies and 70% more citations from local university scientists than the articles of the runners-up do. However, the overall number of citations does not change, suggesting a relocation of local spillovers. Local knowledge flows to the private sector originate mainly from academic stars and the hard sciences. Within academia, the effects are homogeneous across fields and quality of researchers. These results suggest that labor mobility changes the access to local knowledge which in turn affects the direction of innovation in a region.


Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies

Speaker:Klaus Schmidt (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich

2018.03.09, Friday, 16:40 - 18:00

Minxing Building 102, Nanjing Audit University

Abstract:The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each seller prefers to conceal his information until he is awarded the contract and then renegotiate when he is in a bilateral monopoly position with the buyer. We show that this gives rise to three inefficiencies: inefficient renegotiation, inefficient production and inefficient design. We derive the welfare optimal direct mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. The direct mechanism, however, imposes strong assumptions on the buyer's prior knowledge of possible flaws and their payoff consequences. Therefore, we also propose an indirect mechanism that implements the same allocation but does not require any such prior knowledge. The optimal direct and indirect mechanisms separate the improvement of the design and the selection of the seller who produces the good.